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Background and Objectives: Common health state valuation methodology, such as time tradeoff (TTO) and standard gamble
(SG), is typically applied under several descriptively invalid assumptions, for example, related to linear quality-adjusted life
years (QALYs) or expected utility (EU) theory. Hence, the current use of results from health state valuation exercises may lead
to biased QALY weights, which may in turn affect decisions based on economic evaluations using such weights. Methods have
been proposed to correct responses for the biases associated with different health state valuation techniques. In this article
we outline the relevance of prospect theory (PT), which has become the dominant descriptive alternative to EU, for health
state valuations and economic evaluations.
Methods and Results:We provide an overview of work in this ﬁeld, which aims to remove biases from QALY weights. We label
this “the corrective approach.” By quantifying PT parameters, such as loss aversion, probability weighting, and nonlinear
utility, it may be possible to correct TTO and SG responses for biases in an attempt to produce more valid estimates of
preferences for health states. Through straightforward examples, this article illustrates the effects of this corrective approach
and discusses several unresolved issues that currently limit the relevance of corrected weights for policy.
Conclusions: Suggestions for research addressing these issues are provided. Nonetheless, if validly corrected health state
valuations become available, we argue in favor of using these in economic evaluations.
Keywords: corrective approach, loss aversion, prospect theory, QALYs
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Health economic evaluations provide important information to
policy makers,1 such as determining incremental cost-
effectiveness ratios (ICERs) of interventions, that is, the incre-
mental costs per unit of health gained. In cost-utility analyses
health gains are commonly expressed in quality-adjusted life-
years (QALYs), which are obtained by multiplying life duration
with the utility weight(s) of the health state(s) experienced. These
QALY weights are normalized such that 0 and 1 represent the
utility of health states judged equivalent to being dead or perfect
health, respectively. It is well known that QALY weights differ
between health state valuation (HSV) methods used to obtain
them: standard gamble (SG) weights are typically higher than
weights obtained with time trade-off (TTO) methodologies.2–4
Bleichrodt5 proposed that these differences occur as result of
bias because of the “classical elicitation assumption,” that is,
applying expected utility (EU) theory to analyze individual
choices.6 Although research in behavioral economics andss correspondence to: Stefan A. Lipman, MSc, PO Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotter
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doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2019.01.013psychology has established many systematic violations of EU (for a
review of these violations in the monetary domain, see Starmer7),
its axioms still underlie QALY weight calculations applied in HSV
exercises.8–10 To better inform healthcare decisions, it has been
suggested that these biased QALY weights could be corrected by
applying calculations based on alternative utility models such as
prospect theory.6,11
Prospect theory (PT)12,13 by now is a well established behav-
ioral theory that assumes people judge states relative to some
reference point (such as the current position). Changes relative to
that point are perceived as either losses or gains. Furthermore,
utility increases for gains are lower than utility decreases for
equally sized losses; that is, people are loss averse. People,
moreover, are not “perfect calculators.” They tend to overweight
small probabilities and underweight large ones. This is labeled as
“probability weighting.”12,13 It has been suggested that reference
points, loss aversion, and probability weighting affect decisions
about health (eg,8,11,14–16), perhaps more pronouncedly than in
ﬁnancial decision making.17 Importantly, these insights maydam, The Netherlands. Email: lipman@eshpm.eur.nl
Health Economics and Outcomes Research. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an
enses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
BOX 1. The Time Trade-Off (TTO) and Standard Gamble (SG)
methods
TTO exercises involve choices between living longer (say 10
years) in a imperfect health state or shorter (,10 years) in
perfect health. The number of years in imperfect health is
varied until the respondent is indifferent between the two
options. Assuming the linear QALY model,57 the utility of the
imperfect health state is given by dividing the duration in full
health by the duration in imperfect health (eg. as in work by
Walters).19 Hence, if a person considers 6 years in perfect
health to be equal to 10 years with severe pain, the utility of
this health state is 6/10 = 0.6. The worse the health state, the
greater is the reduction in years in perfect health that people
would be willing to accept. Similarly, SG methods entail
asking subjects to choose between living some period of
time (eg, 10 years) in some imperfect health state for sure
and a gamble with two outcomes: full health (FH) for the
same period of time or immediate death (D). By varying the
probability of immediate death, one may derive the utility of
the imperfect health state. Under EU (and with the utility of
perfect health normalized to 1 and that of death to 0) this
utility equals probability 1-p. For instance, if people accept a
maximum risk of 10% of immediate death to live the rest of
their lifespan in perfect health rather than with moderate
back pain, this implies the utility of the health state
“moderate back pain” is 0.9. If the health state is worse,
people would accept a higher risk of immediate death to
regain health, leading to lower QALY weights.
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HSV methods5 and can be used in pursuit of obtaining QALY
weights that may more accurately reﬂect tradeoffs relevant to
speciﬁc methodologies. For instance, SG responses can be cor-
rected for bias owing to probability weighting, and TTO responses
can be corrected for loss aversion. It has been argued that such a
corrective approach may lead to better (ie, less biased) QALY
weights and hence may have relevance for HSV.5,11 TTO and SG
(see Box 1 for examples) have been the focus of the corrective
approach because these methods are especially relevant to HSV
for generic utility classiﬁcations, with EQ-5D tariffs frequently
being determined via TTO,18 whereas SF-6D tariffs have been ob-
tained via SG.19
Hence, in this article, we focus on the corrective approach in
the context of TTO and SG by providing an overview of de-
velopments in the corrective approach. These developments
opened up at least two challenges to research and policy. First,
applying the corrective approach (with current estimates) may
affect ICER calculations and allocation decisions—especially when
perfect health is involved. Second, even though loss aversion may
lead to bias in HSV, it could reﬂect a real preference many in-
dividuals may hold. Thus, distinguishing between gains and losses
may still be seen as relevant in healthcare decision making. Pre-
venting health losses may, for example, have higher societal value
than achieving health gains of a similar size (relative to a relevant
reference point). Hence, we explore how a loss aversion premium
for prevented health losses could be applied if and when deemed
relevant by responsible policy makers. Finally, we outline policy
implications and important steps for future research.The Corrective Approach: Rationale and
Overview of Earlier Work
Acknowledging that decisions about health may be reference
dependent, as is done in prospect theory, changes the implications
of responses in TTO and SG exercises.5 These implications crucially
depend on the location of the reference point in HSV exercises,
which was the topic of some empirical studies (eg, van Osch20).
Given that this work suggested that the time spent in the
imperfect health state was the most frequently applied reference
point (coinciding with how TTO and SG are typically framed), we
will assume this reference point in HSV throughout the present
article. Under this assumption, TTO involves trading off losses in
life duration for gains in quality of life, whereas picking the risky
option in SG indicates a preference for a mixed gamble generating
either a gain in quality of life or a catastrophic loss of life (ie,
immediate death). As such, loss aversion may exert upward bias in
both methods because of the negative utility of (possible) losses
subjects are willing to incur in TTO and SG is ampliﬁed by loss
aversion and thus signiﬁes a larger utility decrement than
assumed under the classical elicitation assumption.5
Probability weighting only affects SG and generally has an
upward inﬂuence on SG weights. This upward bias results from
subjects’ overweighting of generally small chances of death, and
underweighting of the typically large chance of obtaining full
health in this method.5 In other words, if subjects weight proba-
bilities in this manner, accepting a 10% chance of death in SG may
signify a larger utility decrement than traditionally assumed. In
addition, linear utility of life duration is often assumed in health
state valuation (ie, the linear QALY model). Nevertheless, many
authors have found utility of life years to deviate from linearity in
the ranges typically considered in TTO,16,21–23 where the severity
of this deviation may even depend on how duration is described.24
Such utility curvature will only affect TTO weights because thismethod depends critically on tradeoffs in duration. As shown in
Bleichrodt,5 if utility of life years is concave (ie, each extra year of
life is worth less) instead of linear, TTO weights are biased
downward. Inversely, when utility of life years is convex (ie, each
subsequent year is worth more than the previous) instead of
linear, then the TTO weights are biased upward.
Although EU is often considered the “right” normative the-
ory,12,25–27 retaining the classical elicitation assumption mistakes
the empirical nature of HSV, in which deviations from EU are
likely if not inevitable,6 with the normative relevance that QALYs
may have in economic evaluations. Consequently, several studies
exist that applied a corrective approach,28–34 each using the same
two steps: i) quantify the deviations from EU and the linear QALY
model, such as loss aversion and nonlinear utility, and ii) use
corrective formulas6,11,29 to account for their confounding effect on
HSV. Considerable differences exist between empirical studies
regarding both steps, with researchers using different techniques
to quantify PT or applying corrective formulas based on different
assumptions about decision making. A frequently applied
approach is to pre-emptively assume a certain degree of loss
aversion, utility curvature, and probability weighting in all re-
spondents.35 In this type of work, average parameters elicited in
earlier work (eg, loss aversion coefﬁcients of 2.25) are applied to
each individual. Nevertheless, typically large differences in loss
aversion, utility curvature, and probability weighting are observed
between individuals; that is, not everyone is equally loss averse or
weighs probabilities the same way.
Therefore, other attempts at correcting TTO or SG weights
apply an individual approach, in which PT parameters are elicited
separately for each respondent, applying corrections for loss
aversion31 or nonlinear utility of life duration,29,33 for example. In
this work, utility of life duration or probability weighting is typi-
cally estimated by assuming speciﬁc functional forms.30,33,34,36
BOX 2. The impact of the corrective approach on ICERs
Imagine a group of patients who experience moderate
problems with walking about, slight problems with usual
activities and slight pain or discomfort (31221 in EQ-5D
nomenclature, b2 in Appendix A). In a study by Lipman
et al11, the classical TTO and SG weights for b2 were elicited
at 0.605, and 0.706, respectively. We let U(.) represent the
utility assigned to health states. Assume that a treatment is
evaluated that returns these patients to full health for 30
years, and the costs for treatment are V 20,000 per year.
Without discounting, we then obtain the following ICERs:
ICERTTO ¼ V20;000  30 years ¼ V600;00030 ðUðFHÞ2 Uðb2Þ Þ ¼ 30  0:395 ¼ 11:85 = 50,632V/QALY,
ICERSG ¼ V20;000  30 years ¼ V600;00030 ðUðFHÞ2 Uðb2Þ Þ ¼ 30  0:294 ¼ 8:82 = 68,027V/QALY.
If we repeat our calculations using corrected SG and TTO
weights, which were 0.442 and 0.456 respectively (see
Appendix A), we obtain the following ICERs:
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the mathematical properties of the chosen parametrical form may
not ﬁt well for some extreme cases, for example.37 Indeed, liter-
ature exists documenting that parametric analysis may result in
biases in individual estimates for PT.38,39 Recently, the nonpara-
metric method by Abdellaoui et al38 was adapted to correct TTO
and SG weights without parametric assumptions.11 In that study,
as was expected under PT, concave utility for life year gains and
convex utility for losses were observed, with considerable loss
aversion and probability weighting for both gains and losses. After
applying the corrective approach, TTO and SG weights converged,
as predicted by Bleichrodt.5 Nevertheless, the resulting corrected
QALY weights seemed quite low and compressed, raising ques-
tions about their validity (see Appendix I for numerical examples
of corrections based on this study).
Collectively, these developments in PT measurement and the
corrective approach could be important for health policy because
they suggest that it may be possible to move beyond the classical
elicitation assumption for TTO and SG weights, which still domi-
nates applications of HSV.ICERTTO2C ¼ V20;000  30 years ¼ V600;00030 ðUðFHÞ2 Uðb2Þ Þ ¼ 30  0:558 ¼ 16:74 = 35,842V/QALY,
ICERSG2C ¼ V20;000  30 years ¼ V600;00030 ðUðFHÞ2 Uðb2Þ Þ ¼ 30  0:551 ¼ 16:32 = 36,765V/QALY.
BOX 3. The impact of the corrective approach on allocation
decisions
Imagine two patient populations that have the same initial
quality of life: a mild health state characterized by slight
problems in mobility and self-care (21211, b1 in Appendix A).
Treatment A will return population Pa to perfect health, that
is, treatment A is curative. Treatment B, on the other hand,
will prevent population Pb from a sure loss in quality of life,
from state b1 to b3 (32341), a health state characterized by
moderate problems with mobility, slight problems with self-
care, moderate problems with usual activity, and severe
pain. In other words, we have to choose between funding A,
which involves Pa gaining U(FH)2U(b1), while funding B
prevents a loss in quality of life of U(b3)2U(b1) for Pb. Under
the classical elicitation assumption, we observe that the
utility differences between U(b3)2U(b1) and U(FH)2U(b1) are
of similar magnitude, independent of which method is used
to elicit these weights (see Fig. 1A). After correction, however,
utility for b1 (see Fig. 1B) has dropped substantially, which
could change the allocation decision problem between A and
B in favor of Treatment A (ceteris paribus).The Impact of the Corrective Approach on
Health Policy
Regardless of these developments, the corrective approach
currently does not affect the policy domain: only a single study28
exists that estimated corrected tariff lists (ie, without assuming
EU), and no country has adopted the corrective approach in
guidelines for economic evaluations. Of course, this gap between
the current state-of-the-art in the literature and policy may in part
be caused by unresolved questions about validity or feasibility of
the corrective approach. We return to these important questions
in the ﬁnal section of this article, for now disregarding them to
address two currently understudied corollaries of applying the
corrective approach. First, we illustrate with currently available
weights that moving from the classical elicitation assumption to a
corrective approach may substantially affect ICERs and allocation
decisions, especially when treatments involve perfect health.
Second, we explore how loss aversion, which produces bias that
we argued needs correction in HSV, could still have relevance in
the context of health policy.
To Correct or Not to Correct: It Makes a Difference
Currently, TTO and SG weights (or weights derived from clas-
siﬁcation systems using these methods) are commonly elicited
assuming EU or the linear QALY model. Hence, at least implicitly,
the classical elicitation assumption is still applied. Our focus is to
compare this status quo to the situation in which the corrective
approach would be applied. We will refer to TTO and SG weights
calculated under the classical elicitation assumption as classical
weights and refer to corrected weights when the corrective
approach is applied. Without correction, TTO and SG typically
yield different QALY weights,2–4 and hence, it is obvious that ICERs
for the same treatment could vary substantially (and systemati-
cally) depending on which method is used to value health bene-
ﬁts—especially for treatments dealing with full health. If we
choose to apply corrections, we could observe converging TTO and
SG weights, and hence converging ICERs for both methods (see
Box 2 for an example using currently available estimates). Simi-
larly, applying the corrective approach may affect allocation de-
cisions in different situations compared with using classical
weights (see Box 3 for an example). In both cases, applying the
corrective approach will likely lead to a lower valuations of
impaired health states.5,11Although applying a corrective approach in calculations of
QALY weights from HSV exercises will likely improve under-
standing of choices in TTO and SG, it is not yet clear to what extent
this corrective approach ultimately yields QALY weights that
better reﬂect preferences for health states. Obviously, the exact
impact of utilizing corrected weights instead of classical weights
on subsequent economic evaluations will depend on the respec-
tive valuations of health states associated with the treatment and
control groups, which raises two crucial issues. First, whereas Box
2 and Box 3 illustrate that the corrective approach may have
considerable effects on ICERs and allocation decisions for treat-
ments moving patients between impaired health states and full
health, the effects of correction on movements between health
Figure 1. A: TTO and SG weight differences with classical estimation. B: TTO and SG weight differences under the corrective approach.
Classical weights Corrected weightsA B
TTO
SG
TTO
SG
  Utility Utility
U(β3)
U(β3)
U(β3)
U(β3)
U(β1)
U(β1)
U(β1)
U(β1)
U(FH)
U(FH)
U(FH)
U(FH)
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
SG indicates standard gamble; TTO, time trade-off.
METHODOLOGY 819states that differ only slightly are currently unknown. Given that
treatments yielding full recovery are likely to be rare, more insight
into how such small improvements or deteriorations in health
status are affected by deciding to correct or not to correct (for both
SG and TTO) is an important avenue for future research. Second, as
can be seen from Box 2 and Box 3, another corollary of applying
the corrective approach is that a “perfect-health gap” may be
exacerbated. Note that whether or not such a gap emerges de-
pends on ﬁnal corrected weights. Nevertheless, currently available
corrected weights suggest that the distance in utility between the
mildest impaired health states, which in current estimates receive
lower QALY weights after correcting for bias owing to loss aver-
sion, utility curvature, and probability weighting, and the utility of
perfect health, which remains stable at 1.00, increases. As a result,
applying the corrective approach may especially affect ICERs of
and allocation decisions for treatments involving patients losing
or returning to perfect health. Incremental cost-effectiveness thus
increases (as shown in Box 2) for treatments that return patients
to full health, with potential policy and allocation implications (as
in Box 3).
It is yet unclear whether this “perfect health gap” is simply the
result of poor correction of bias in TTO and SG, and as such an
unintended and undesirable by-product of applying the corrective
approach, or reﬂects actual individual or societal preferences.
Implicitly, a perfect health gap already exists in many applications
of tariff estimations for utility classiﬁcation systems.18,40,41
Whether the larger gap aligns with preferences needs to be
established further, especially because correction may enlarge the
gap, emphasizing the special status perfect health may have.
Nevertheless, earlier work applying a similar corrective approach
outside the health domain found that correcting for PT may lead
to compression of utility weights.6 It was suggested that this
compression was unrelated to individuals’ preferences, but rather
resulted from the speciﬁc parameterized correction process
applied. Such compression of corrected weights could explain the
enlarged perfect health gap. Indeed, if the utility estimates of
impaired health states are compressed and come closer to the
midpoint of the 0 to 1 scale (as in Appendix I), while perfect health
remains ﬁxed at 1, this inevitably leads to a (larger) gap.Moreover, if this compression effect is strong enough, it could
also explain the convergence of TTO and SG valuations (as all values
cluster in the middle of the scale). The convergence of valuations
usingbothmethodshasbeen interpreted inearlierwork as evidence
of successful correction.11,34 Hence, it is crucial to determine
whether the corrective approach leads to such unwarranted
compression of QALY weights, and indeed whether corrected
weights better reﬂect preferences for health states than classical
weights. The move toward individual corrective approaches,11
combined with, for example, ex-post validation of corrected
weights in personal interviews in future work, could shed light on
this issue. Such insight in the validity of classical and corrected
weights is pivotal in interpreting the observed convergence of
health state valuations obtained through different methods as well
as the increasedperfect health gap, andwebelieve that it is required
before the corrective approach is applied in economic evaluation.
To Prevent Is Better Than to Cure: Exploring the Loss
Aversion Premium
Applying the corrective approach implies correcting for bias in
TTO and SG weights that results from loss aversion, probability
weighting, and utility curvature. This may be desirable because
TTO and SG are not designed to reﬂect these time and risk pref-
erences; they were designed to reﬂect preferences for health
states. As such, in our view, if time and risk preferences are
deemed relevant for health policy, HSV is not the context in which
they should be considered. Rather, this should occur within eco-
nomic evaluations if deemed appropriate. For time preferences
this is already common practice: often a discount rate is applied to
future life years in cost-effectiveness analyses,1 which may reﬂect
societal time preferences for health outcomes.42 Nevertheless, to
avoid “double discounting,” TTO weights should be adjusted for
individual utility curvature (or time preferences) before applying
such societal discount rates in economic evaluations.43 Thus, in-
dividuals’ discounting in TTO should be corrected for initially in
HSV, and policy makers can decide if and which societal time
preference is to be incorporated in economic evaluations. Appli-
cation of the corrective approach would extend the ﬁrst step of
820 VALUE IN HEALTH JULY 2019this sequence to also correct for loss aversion and probability
weighting. Nevertheless, no work exists on providing a rationale
or methods for also applying this second step for loss aversion or
probability weighting, even though it is well known that loss
aversion and probability weighting apply to health outcomes as
well.11,14,44–46
Several authors provided arguments that loss aversion and
probability weighting, although yielding bias in TTO and SG, need
not be irrelevant or irrational. For example, Huber et al47 wrote, “In
many settings, one cannot tell whether loss aversion is a bias or
merely a reﬂection of the fact that losses have more emotional
impact than gains of equal magnitude.” Similarly, Diecidue and
Wakker48 argued that probability weighting could reﬂect in-
dividuals’ decision that some outcomes are especially important
and should receive more attention than equally likely outcomes. As
such, just as societal time preference, both probability weighting
and loss aversion could provide information relevant for economic
evaluations and healthcare decision makers. They may signal that
(possible) health losses are perceived to have large emotional
impact by many members of society. Hence, this preference infor-
mation could be viewed as a relevant input in decisions based on
economic evaluations of health technologies dealing with (risks of)
health losses. Below, we will explore how policy makers may
include suchbehavioral insights in sucheconomic evaluations,with
a focus on loss aversion (developing a similar approach for proba-
bility weighting is beyond the scope of this article and less intuitive
in the context of economic evaluation).
To interpret or apply insights based on loss aversion in economic
evaluations, it is important to consider which reference point is
taken—otherwise losses and gains are undeﬁned. For example, one
could take individuals’ current health as reference point, which
implies that preventive treatments reduce health losses, while
curative treatments generate health gains (typically after some loss
is incurred). Loss aversion could then refer to a social preference for
preventive treatments over curative treatments (ceteris paribus).
Nevertheless, extensive literature on equity weighting in health
exists suggesting that people on average prefer to treat thoseworse
off (eg, Van de Wetering49). Furthermore, research has also docu-
mented that age-dependent expectations about length and quality
of life could also serve as reference point.50–52 Collectively, these
ﬁndings indicate that if a similar approach is to be developed as for
time preference, more research on reference points in decisions
about health is required. Nonetheless, in Appendix II, we provide a
ﬁrst suggestion as to how insights from loss aversion may be
included in economic evaluations, by incorporating a loss aversion
premium. When and why policy makers should include a loss
aversion premium in economic evaluations may be explored in
future work taking a broad view of relevant factors in the decision-
making process. For simplicity, this approach, which involves
deliberately adjusting the value assigned to changes between
health states that involve losses, was appliedwith current health as
reference point. Such a loss aversion premium could be used when
this is deemed relevant and normatively acceptable.Conclusions: Research Agenda and Policy
Implications
Besides more discussion on corollaries of the corrective
approach, such as the perfect health gap and a loss aversion
premium, several steps can be outlined for future research. We
suggest that these are necessary for successful potential appli-
cation of the corrective approach in the policy context. First, the
robustness and validity of PT parameters obtained through the
corrective approach should be determined, both individually andcombined, because differences were observed between studies
using different methods.11,14,44–46,53 A head-to-head comparison
of these methods could provide a more in-depth analysis of these
differences and their impact on correction. Second, research
could focus on replicating and extending earlier work on the
corrective approach (eg, Lipman11), preferably with a sample
representative of the relevant population and test the validity of
individually corrected QALY weights. Third, future research
should aim to clarify the effect of PT on QALY weights elicited
with discrete choice experiments (DCE) because these are
employed more frequently in large-scale valuation studies (eg,
Versteegh18). Given that orthogonal comparisons of TTO, SG, and
DCE are nonexistent, only suggestive evidence exists showing
that DCE weights are similar to classical TTO and SG weights.54,55
Nevertheless, given that DCEs are typically applied assuming
random utility models and because they use an aggregate
approach to HSV, it may be difﬁcult to reconcile with corrections
at the individual level. Fourth, as mentioned, the corrective
approach crucially depends on assumptions about the reference
point. Future work should explore the role and nature of the
reference point(s) further, especially for TTO, for example, with
an approach as in van Osch,20 and develop corrections for PT that
are applicable when outcomes other than the time spent in
reduced health are taken as reference point. Finally, if the results
of future research on correcting biases are encouraging, national
tariffs using the corrective approach for the relevant health-
utility classiﬁcation, for example, EQ-5D-5L or SF-6D, could be
obtained to facilitate the incorporation of the corrective
approach within health policy as in Perpiñán.28
Summarizing, if future research indeed demonstrates the merit
of the corrective approach, our suggestion would be to apply the
corrective approach in QALY measurement also in the context of
actual decision making, which entails several steps.
First, in HSV exercises, for example, large-scale valuation
studies, measure each subject’s degree of deviation from EU with
the most accurate methods available and adjust individuals’ re-
sponses accordingly. Although work exists that challenges some of
its core presuppositions (eg, suggesting no stable preferences exist
at all56), PT appears to best capture these deviations.
Second, if these corrected weights are found to be valid (and a
better representation of health state preferences than classical
weights), national tariffs could be calculated based on corrected
weights. These could be used in economic evaluations informing
policy makers.
Third, some of the correction factors used to “clean” health
state valuations may still be informative for policy makers outside
the context of HSV. We have explored how this may be true for
loss aversion, in relation to the distinction between interventions
producing health gains and those preventing health losses.
To conclude, despite developments and increased research
efforts into the corrective approach, many unresolved issues still
exist that caution against its widespread use. This suggests that
the quest for improving methods for HSV, economic evaluations,
and decision making has clearly not ended yet. With this article
we hope to have encouraged both researchers and policy makers
alike to explore these new opportunities.Acknowledgments
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